How we got into this sad state of affairs
The past week has seen the American Army suffering losses in Afghanistan and a series of bomb blasts in Pakistan. Meanwhile, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff has again highlighted the problem of Taliban fighters based in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
Ahmed Rashid’s new book, “Descent into Chaos: How the war against Islamic Extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia” provides probably the most detailed examination yet, of how this sad state of affairs came to be and who is responsible for it.
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From Fareed Zakaria to Andrew Sullivan, an endless array of pundits have argued that they wouldn’t have supported the war if were aware of the scale of the Bush administration’s incompetence. As Ahmed Rashid’s book makes clear, this was a poor excuse. They only needed to look to Afghanistan to see that the American government had no intention to carry out nation-building and were only moderately equipped to fight counter-insurgency campaigns.
While the Republicans in America enjoy accusing anti-war people of wanting to ‘cut and run’, it was the Americans which cut and run from Afghanistan. As a result, Afghanistan is as much of a failed state as when the Taliban took over the first time, Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces have managed to regroup, drug production has increased exponentially and any vestiges of soft power that the Americans may have had in the region has been lost.
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Although America was negligent by not focusing on securing Afghanistan, it only deserves half the blame. As Rashid has carefully documented, demoralised Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters would have found it a lot harder to remobilise if they weren’t receiving the patronage of the Pakistani Army and ISI.
Having grown up in Pakistan, I consider myself reasonably aware of Pakistani politics. However I was completely shocked to read the extent to which the Army continued to support the Taliban and in effect Al-Qaeda, after 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan.
Rashid meticulously exposes the self-delusional fallacies of the Pakistani Army in believing that the Taliban and extremists were the only way of ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul while also being used to carry out attacks in Kashmir.
More importantly, he shows how Musharraf was able to play a masterful double game in which Pakistan would demonstrate its commitment to the War on Terror by helping to catch Arab and western Al-Qaeda, while turning a blind eye – if not actively encouraging Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces to set up bases in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
American and British leaders eager to show results in the War on Terror and unwilling to jeopardise Musharraf’s position (another brilliant piece of propaganda by Musharraf - making himself out to be the bulwark against extremism, whilst simultaneously supporting it), ignored even their commanders reports that the Taliban were using Pakistan to attack them.
After the attempts on Musharraf’s life, a spate of bombings in Pakistan and the Red Mosque affair, Rashid says that it seems that even the army have come to realise the monster it has created. Unfortunately, attempts to disarm the Pakistani Taliban in the border areas have largely been a failure and have demoralised the Army.
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The most plausible critique of Rashid’s book would be that his analysis overestimates the capacity of western and UN forces to carry out nation-building in Afghanistan after the conclusion of the war. As Rashid himself mentions, nation-building has been unsuccessful in places from East Timor to Kosovo.
Given the extent to which Afghanistan has been destroyed through years of Soviet occupation, civil war and Taliban rule, reconstruction would have been an immense task. However if the world really did change after 9/11, ensuring that Afghanistan and Central Asia progressed should have been seen as worth the time and effort that it would have taken.
In fact Rashid’s slightly counter-intuitive argument that the years of devastation actually made the Afghans more open to medium term occupation if it meant that they would have security and redevelopment of basic infrastructure is very persuasive. Afghanistan would not have become immediately prosperous but it would have been stable, which is all the majority of Afghans really wanted.
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The state of affairs in Central Asia is pretty dire and it would need dedicated leadership and a lot of luck to turn things around. However from a liberal policy perspective, one of the most interesting elements of the book is when Rashid describes how European politicians and troops were either unwilling or unable to let the troops fight the counter-insurgency.
In a post Cold War, post 9/11 world it was tempting to think that the role of conventional army would be diminished. However Rashid is persuasive in arguing that the real front line in the war on terror is stabilising areas and countries where terrorists are likely to set up camp. For this, conventional armies are very much required and it is important that European politicians don’t ignore this in an effort to keep defence costs low and public opinion satisfied.
To summarise, the Americans could have helped improve Afghanistan but were insincere (Afghanistan lacked oil unlike Iraq), the European approach is more fortress Europe and a lack of resolve to project power outside Europe (scratch that even in Europe a la Bosnia). Pakistan was promoting the Taliban as a counterweight against perceived secessionist nationalists and as cannon fodder in it’s proxy wars against India. The Taliban are now instead using Pakistan territory to wage proxy wars against the West.
The West and Pak bashers blame Pakistan for creating the Taliban but get offended if anyone says the same about OBL and the west.
Being someone originally from the Paksitan side of the Afghan border i can say if a real effort was spent right now on the North West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas ..on development the area could be cleared without a bullet being fired..we are talking a billion dollars at best..a pittance compared to whats being spent in Afghanistan..but is anyone listening?…
‘The most plausible critique of Rashid’s book would be that his analysis overestimates the capacity of western and UN forces to carry out nation-building in Afghanistan after the conclusion of the war.’
Yes - but that begs wider questions. Why has the UN not geared itself up for such activity? It is not as though the need for it is novel, only the scale.
It could be that ‘the West’ (whatever that means) underestimates what nation-building entails or indeed overestimates the capacity of locals.
I personally do not think we need a UN - let globalisation take care of the uniting part on its own. We an NB (Nation Builder).
It may well be, as is implicit in the article that democracy in a ‘real’ sense and stability do not reconcile - not a palatable thought for those who believe that peace is a default setting.
You can watch Ahmed Rashid’s analysis via an interview as well if you are too lazy to read : ) …
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/interview+ahmed+rashid/2307377
It’s interesting that the author says the war is being lost in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This suggests that he agrees with what appears to be a consensus that the war in Iraq is being won.
This being the case, the solution in Afghanistan is a “surge”, wouldn’t you say?
Zak, great summary. The only thing I’d disagree with is that although the west helped create OBL that was a while ago. On the other hand Pakistan continued to see the Taliban as the best option for Afghanistan despite seeing the impact they had on the country and the rest of the world after 9/11.
Bishop Hill, the UN has been successful in deploying its peacekeepers in certain areas. However for something like Afghanistan, it needed troops on a much larger scale and the European countries also needed to realise that the troops needed to be able to fight the counter-insurgents rather than simply peace-keeping.
Bishop Hill, neither me nor the author think that the war in Iraq is being won. The thing is, a lot of the mistakes made in Afghanistan were repeated in Iraq.
A strong troop deployment in Afghanistan could have been really useful after the war. I’m not sure it would work now. Besides the US doesn’t really have the troops. Also the political concensus which had been established has broken down.
True Shariq, but there is a difference between Pakistans establishment and Pakistan..for others reading this Pakistan’s establishment is the equivalent of Turkeys Deep state http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_state
The past week has seen the American Army…
No mention of the civilians killed (by either side)?
“The only thing I’d disagree with is that although the west helped create OBL that was a while ago.”
I am a bit confused when people say the west “created” OBL. Bin Laden was not financed by the west. You have to recall Bin Laden was primarily a financier of the militants not an actual fighter. With his family worth near $15 billion and a personal inheritance of $0.5 billion, he was a major funneler of money to the militants. The US also financied militant as well though they did not focus on pashtun/arab militants as OBL did but gave resources to what became the northern alliance (i.e. Masood) as well.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5151657
The war in Iraq is being won? By what measurement? Going by the previous level of hell they were going through, it is obviously better. But do remember this precarious position has been created by allying with various sunni/shia groups on the ground who hate al-Qaeda more. The minute those groups have different priorities… like say once al-qaeda is no longer important and they want to start running their own localities, the foreign forces are screwed.
The war in Iraq hasn’t been won. Its just no longer as bad as it used to be.
Thabet, fair point. The amount of civilian casualties caused by American mistakes and Warlord brutality has contributed to the deterioration of goodwill. Now that the Taliban has regrouped, they are occurring from the other side as well. Overall it is a desperate situation.
sunny,
ya know I have read this blog for years but seldom take the time to comment here or anywhere else.
It gets harder and harder to see or remember what anyones actual views are, let alone what they are trying to do?
So you were against the war in Iraq? Does that mean you supported Saddam? I doubt it …. But what do you support? I don’t get the point of your recent posts then? or any other dealing with “oppression” “corruption” or “human rights horrors” in other countries.
You suggest the government using force through law to promote equality in the UK as an aide to spreading of individual freedom…. but you oppose our involvement else where?
Haven’t you in the past labeled the americans an “occupation”? …
I don’t understand your comment #9 then?
honestly I don’t understand anyone… so Im just asking here…
What exactly would make you happy?
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